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This article highlights some of the significant law
review articles published (or at least disseminated)
in the last couple of years on the U.S. Constitution
and taxation — in particular, the constitutional
provisions that deal explicitly with the national
taxing power and limitations on that power.
The Constitution can affect taxation in many
ways, of course, but I generally limited my search to
articles dealing with the origination clause,1 the
taxing clause,2 the uniformity clause,3 the direct tax
clauses,4 the 16th Amendment,5 and the export
clause.6 Not all of those subjects were represented in

1

U.S. Const. Art. I, section 7, cl. 1; see infra text accompanying
note 15.
2
U.S. Const. Art. I, section 8, cl. 1 (giving Congress the
‘‘Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises’’).
3
Id. (providing that ‘‘all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States’’).
4
U.S. Const. Art. I, section 2 (providing that ‘‘direct Taxes
shall be apportioned among the several States which may be
included within the Union, according to their respective Numbers’’); U.S. Const. Art. I, section 9, cl. 4 (providing that ‘‘No
Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be
taken’’).
5
U.S. Const. Amend. XVI (providing that ‘‘the Congress shall
have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration’’).
6
U.S. Const. Art. I, section 9, cl. 5 (providing that ‘‘no Tax or
Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State’’).

the recent law review literature, but what was there
was enough to keep me busy (or as busy as an
academic ever gets).
Largely because of my own ignorance, I did not
look for articles discussing other connections between the Constitution and taxation. For example,
with one exception, I do not report on articles that
deal primarily with federalism issues, even if
there’s a taxation subtext, such as the burgeoning
literature on the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Windsor.7 Constitutional limitations on
states’ taxing powers are also outside my expertise,
although this important subject is of continuing
interest, as a recent Supreme Court decision illustrates.8 Some other constitutional issues that I did
not include in this project are set out in the footnote
below.9

7
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). Under the Defense of Marriage Act,
Edith Windsor’s same-sex marriage, which was valid under
state law, wasn’t recognized for federal purposes, and Windsor
had therefore been denied the federal estate tax exemption for
surviving spouses. So, in a sense, Windsor was a tax case. The
issue wasn’t the federal taxing power per se, however. It was
whether the federal government can, for tax and other purposes, define marriage in a way inconsistent with the definition
in some states. (The answer was no.)
8
See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787
(2015) (holding that a tax on the income of Maryland residents
violated the dormant commerce clause to the extent the income
taxed was earned outside Maryland, and the taxpayer wasn’t
entitled to a credit against Maryland taxes for taxes paid to other
states). For a fascinating look at the federalism issues implicated
by use of the general welfare and necessary and proper clauses
— what Alison L. Lacroix refers to as ‘‘shadow powers’’ second
only to the commerce clause as a source of federal power — see
Lacroix, ‘‘The Shadow Powers of Article I,’’ 123 Yale L.J. 2044
(2014).
9
The distinction between taxation and a taking is fascinating,
but it’s a subject unlikely to come up very often, except as a
throwaway argument. But see Karl Manheim, ‘‘The Health
Insurance Mandate — a Tax or a Taking?’’ 42 Hastings Con. L.Q.
101 (2015) (an extended discussion of what distinguishes taxes
from takings).
I also didn’t focus on articles arguing that statutes or
regulations are unconstitutional because they were improperly
adopted. See, e.g., Linda D. Jellum, ‘‘Dodging the Taxman: Why
the Treasury’s Anti-Abuse Regulation Is Unconstitutional,’’ 70
U. Miami L. Rev. 152 (2015) (arguing that reg. section 1.701-1, the
partnership antiabuse provision, is unconstitutional because
Congress neither explicitly nor implicitly delegated to Treasury
the authority to codify the antiabuse doctrines).
Finally, I love the so-called parsonage allowance (see section
107) (excluding from the gross income of a ‘‘minister of the
gospel’’ the rental value of a home provided or the allowance

(Footnote continued on next page.)
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A. The Origination Clause
Let’s begin at the origination. The origination
clause provides that ‘‘all Bills for raising Revenue
shall originate in the House of Representatives; but
the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.’’14
This clause, seemingly requiring that bills that
would impose additional taxes (or other revenuegenerating charges) must have their origins in the
House, generally isn’t a subject of controversy.
That’s partly because the clause really doesn’t seem
to matter and partly because Congress and a few
courts have come to accept a subterfuge as satisfying the clause’s requirements.

provided to acquire a home and associated furnishing and
appurtenances). Even with ‘‘minister of the gospel’’ necessarily
(and wonderfully) interpreted to include rabbis and imams, the
provision is subject to constitutional attack. The issues are
largely under the First Amendment, however, and are not
attributable to the taxing power.
10
135 S. Ct. 2486 (2015).
11
The Court in King considered whether tax credits under
Obamacare were available to otherwise eligible persons who
acquired health insurance on a federal exchange rather than an
exchange established by a state. Under the Affordable Care Act,
the federal government established exchanges in states that
didn’t create their own exchanges. But the credits were to be
available to persons only if their insurance was acquired from
an exchange ‘‘established by the State under section 1311’’ of the
act. The technical issue in the case was whether that phrase
encompasses exchanges established by the federal government
under section 1321 of the act. Read in isolation, the statutory
language pretty clearly said no, but Treasury had issued regulations to the contrary. And if ‘‘no’’ had been the Court’s answer,
Obamacare might have been driven into a death spiral (a term
used by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.). The Court concluded
that despite the statutory language, Congress could not have
intended such a result. As complex as the analysis was in King,
it was all a matter of statutory interpretation.
12
See section 7421(a) (providing that ‘‘no suit for the purpose
of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be
maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such
person is the person against whom such tax was assessed’’).
13
No offense to statutes.
14
U.S. Const. Art. I, section 7, cl. 1.

The origination clause doesn’t seem to matter
because the House has to agree on any legislation
anyway, whether dealing with revenue or not. If the
House signs off on revenue-raising legislation that
originates in the Senate — or, for that matter, in the
executive department or the faculty lounge at Harvard Law School — why should anyone else care?
(If the House is willing to waive its constitutional
prerogatives, what business is it of ours?) Yes, folks
should generally follow the rules, even stupid rules,
but if a rule seems to make no difference, why not
just ignore it?15
And many, maybe most, of the original justifications for the clause are suspect. One justification
was that the House would be closer to the people
than the Senate would be, and that closeness would
prevent Congress from acting oppressively. But
seven states today have only one representative in
the House. Was Sen. Bernie Sanders, for example,
really closer to the people when he served as
Vermont’s sole representative than he is now as one
of two senators from that state?
To be sure, Congress generally does go through
the motions of adhering to the origination clause,
and here’s where the subterfuge comes in. If the
Senate substitutes its revenue-raising language for
language in a bill that bears a House number, the
general understanding is that the constitutional
requirements are met, even if the House was basically a spectator in the process — at least insofar as
the House-originated form of the bill involved
raising revenue. (The Senate amendment must be
germane to be permitted under the origination
clause. For example, the Senate can’t add or substitute a revenue-raising provision in a bill declaring
National Dogcatchers’ Day.) Under the language of
the origination clause, ‘‘the Senate may propose or
concur with Amendments as on other Bills,’’ and
substituting new tax language for old tax language
is arguably merely an amendment to an existing bill
for raising revenue.
The origination clause seemed to have assumed
new importance after the Supreme Court’s decision
in National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB)
v. Sebelius.16 Yes, there were some openly revenueraising provisions in the Obamacare legislation, but
the tax nature of the legislation was heightened
when the Court held that the individual mandate
penalty was itself a tax, authorized by the taxing
clause of the Constitution, rather than what Congress had called it: a penalty for failure to acquire
health insurance. Because the sharply divided

15
See Joseph J. Thorndike, ‘‘The Origination Clause? Let It
Go,’’ Forbes.com, Aug. 7, 2014.
16
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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Finally, everyone knows but sometimes forgets
that not all tax disputes rise to constitutional levels.
Most disputes don’t, of course, even those of enormous importance. For example, the survival of
Obamacare may well have depended on the result
in King v. Burwell,10 and that case will be a subject of
commentary for years to come. But King involved
statutory interpretation issues, not constitutional
ones,11 and I’ve therefore not included articles on
that case, nor have I included works on the tax
Anti-Injunction Act,12 a statute often treated as if it
were quasi-constitutional. The Anti-Injunction Act
may have constitutional overtones, but it, too, is just
a statute.13
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Recharacterizing the penalty as a tax has led to
the argument that the Obamacare legislation, at
least in significant part, was a measure to raise
revenue. The Affordable Care Act, as enacted, did
bear a House number (H.R. 3590), but the Senate
had made major modifications to the original form
of the legislation. (H.R. 3590 began as a six-page
measure intended to ‘‘amend the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 to modify the first-time homebuyers
credit in the case of members of the Armed Forces
and certain other Federal employees, and for other
purposes.’’18) The ACA was not, the argument goes,
merely an amendment to a revenue-raising bill.
Whether the origination clause governed a final
bill that contained revenue-raising measures but
was not primarily designed to raise revenue was a
matter of debate. It had been understood for a long
time that a bill for which raising revenue was
incidental was not subject to the clause. In this case,
however, everyone agreed, I think, that the individual mandate penalty, although a small part of a
voluminous bill, was central to the legislation.
Without the penalty (the ‘‘tax’’) in place, the increase in health insurance coverage necessary for
Obamacare to work — pushing more healthy
people to acquire insurance that they were likely to
make little use of — would not have happened. So
maybe the ACA language consisted of revenueraising language that was substituted for revenueraising language in the original House version of
H.R. 3590, but the connection was tenuous at best.
That issue has probably gone away in the real
world, at least for a while, now that the Supreme
Court has denied certiorari in a case that raised, at
the trial court level, precisely that origination clause
issue.19 But the intellectual issues remain, and they
are masterfully addressed in several recent articles.

17
Only Roberts seemed to be enthusiastic about evaluating
the legislation in this way, but he was able to get four other
justices to grudgingly accept this analysis. For those four, this
was the only way to save the individual mandate.
18
H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009).
19
See Hotze v. Sebelius, 991 F. Supp.2d 864 (S.D. Tex. 2014)
(rejecting various challenges to the ACA, including one under
the origination clause, and concluding, in the alternative, that
the act was not primarily one for raising revenue, or, if it was,
that the origination clause’s requirements were satisfied because
the legislation bore a House number), vacated and remanded sub
nom., Hotze v. Lew, 784 F.3d 984 (5th Cir. 2014) (concluding that
the district court had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the

1. Rebecca M. Kysar, ‘‘The ‘Shell Bill’ Game:
Avoidance and the Origination Clause,’’ 91 Wash.
U. L. Rev. 659 (2014). This piece is a terrific discussion of the subterfuge — the ‘‘shell bill game’’ being
the Senate substituting its language for that in a bill
bearing a House number. The article is historically
rich and extremely engaging. Professor Kysar’s
conclusion is that courts quite properly resist interjecting themselves into origination clause disputes.
She posits a ‘‘legislative process avoidance doctrine’’ under which courts reasonably keep their
judicial hands off the legislative process, in this case
including the Senate’s own interpretation of its
amendment power under the origination clause.
In short, it’s largely for Congress to enforce the
origination clause if it so desires, and the House
does have the power to ‘‘blue slip’’ a bill (returning
the bill to the Senate) if it concludes that the Senate
has overstepped its constitutional authority. (Blue
slipping happens occasionally, but not often, and
when it does, it’s often because of politics, not
constitutional principle.) That the subterfuge continues may be unfortunate, but it’s understandable.
‘‘Shell bill game’’ isn’t the sort of term I would want
associated with my activities, but it was a not
surprising reaction to the origination clause.
2. Robert G. Natelson, ‘‘The Founders’ Origination
Clause and Implications for the Affordable Care
Act,’’ 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 629 (2015). Natelson
hits the Obamacare issues head-on and does so with
a fascinating discussion of the original meaning of
the origination clause, looking not only to the usual
founding documents but also to British and American legislative practices at the time. (I understand
that some ridicule the attempt to discern the intent
of the founders, but trying to interpret legal language — in a contract, a regulation, a statute, or a
constitution — without trying to understand what
the drafters had in mind seems like an effort in
futility.20) Natelson’s conclusion is that the Senate’s
power under the origination clause to amend bills
for raising revenue means that the Senate has the
power to completely substitute its own revenueraising provisions for House language that would
raise revenue. That is, the power to amend does
include a germaneness requirement, but substituting new tax language for old satisfies that requirement. He argues, however, that the Senate has no

plaintiff lacked standing). See also Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 951 F. Supp.2d 159 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 760 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2014).
20
Yes, with constitutional interpretation — and probably
statutory interpretation as well — there will be times, maybe
many times, when the original understanding can’t be definitively discerned. But the effort to understand purpose is no less
worthwhile.

(Footnote continued in next column.)
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Court concluded that Congress had no power under the commerce clause to require folks to acquire
a particular product like insurance, a penalty to
enforce an unconstitutional requirement would itself have been unconstitutional.17
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ment should be evaluated to determine whether
they are in fact for raising revenue and, if so,
whether they are germane to the purposes of the tax
provisions in the House-originated legislation.

3. Steven J. Willis and Hans G. Tanzler IV, ‘‘The
Wrong House: Why ‘Obamacare’ Violates the U.S.
Constitution’s Origination Clause,’’ Washington
Legal Foundation Working Paper Series No. 189
(Jan. 2015).22 This article doesn’t seem to have made
its way into traditional print yet, but then traditional print seems to be disappearing for most
purposes. In any event, the article is easily available
online (even though it may still be a work in
progress).
Willis and Tanzler unabashedly argue that the
origination clause has content — enforceable content that matters today — and that the taxation
provisions of the Obamacare legislation violated the
clause. Their argument is that courts have improperly applied a primary purpose test to determine
whether a tax provision hidden in an omnibus piece
of legislation should be treated as subject to evaluation under the origination clause. Under that judicial understanding, if the original House bill or the
Senate amendment includes a few taxation provisions that are part of a larger piece of legislation
with a primary purpose other than raising revenue,
the original bill or the amendment doesn’t implicate
the clause. Willis and Tanzler argue instead that
individual taxation provisions in a Senate amend-

Scholars will be mining NFIB for years. For tax
purposes, the important conclusions in the controlling opinion of Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.,
reluctantly joined by four other justices, were that
(1) the individual mandate penalty in the Obamacare legislation for failing to acquire suitable health
insurance is a tax authorized by the taxing clause of
the Constitution23 rather than a penalty to enforce a
power that Congress does not have;24 but that (2)
the ‘‘penalty’’ isn’t a direct tax that would have to
be apportioned among the states on the basis of
population.25 The Roberts opinion has important,
and not always convincing, things to say about
what distinguishes taxes from penalties and, for
taxes, what distinguishes direct taxes from indirect

21
I don’t mean that as a criticism. I love academic arguments
that are unlikely to affect the real world. Indeed, I’ve made
many myself.
22
Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=2507867. (If I am citing to something other than the
most recent version of this article, I apologize.)

Applying those tests, Willis and Tanzler conclude
that the tax provisions in Obamacare would fail. To
be sure, this is a minority view among the few
theorists who care about the origination clause, but
the article’s unusual perspective is a worthwhile
reason for looking at it.
4. Tessa L. Dysart, ‘‘The Origination Clause, the
Affordable Care Act, and Indirect Constitutional
Violations,’’ 24 Corn. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 451 (2015).
No defender of the shell bill game, Professor Dysart
argues that ‘‘permitting the Senate to use delete and
replace renders the Origination Clause a meaningless constitutional provision.’’ That’s a defensible
description of the clause’s status today, but that
status is unlikely to change without a change in
congressional practices.
B. Articles on Other Aspects of NFIB

23

The four justices who joined Roberts’s opinion on this
point (Justices Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Elena
Kagan, and Sonia Sotomayor) did so reluctantly because they
thought that the commerce clause provided sufficient authority
for the individual mandate and that reaching issues under the
taxing clause should have been unnecessary. See supra note 17.
24
Roberts’s opinion, joined by the four dissenters in the case
on this point, concluded that Congress did not have power
under the commerce clause to require the purchase of insurance.
A penalty to impose that requirement would therefore also have
no constitutional underpinning unless the penalty could be
recharacterized as a tax. The desirability of using a tax penalty
to induce desired behavior, even if there are no constitutional
problems, isn’t obvious. On that point, Jeffrey H. Kahn, ‘‘The
Individual Mandate Tax Penalty,’’ 47 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 319 (2014),
is worth a read.
25
See supra note 4. That is, it would have to be apportioned
unless it was characterized as a tax on income, which would be
exempted from apportionment by the 16th Amendment. See
supra note 5.
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power to amend a House revenue-raising bill by
adding nontax provisions to it.
In Natelson’s view, a ‘‘bill for raising Revenue’’ is
a bill to impose a tax, a tax for which there would be
no constitutional authority other than the taxing
clause. The individual mandate penalty, as a tax (if
that’s what it is), could properly be included in a
Senate amendment to a House-originated revenue
measure, but the Senate did not have the power to
add new regulatory and appropriation provisions
to House legislation that fit the origination clause’s
definition of a bill for raising revenue. Natelson
therefore concludes that origination clause attacks
on Obamacare have focused on the wrong issues.
The problem with H.R. 3590, as enacted into law,
isn’t the taxing provisions added by the Senate; it’s
the other stuff the Senate stuffed into the bill.
Natelson’s argument is formidable, but there’s no
plausible reason, I think, to believe a court today
would be any more sympathetic to enforcing his
conception of the origination clause than courts
have generally been to enforcing the clause as more
generally understood.21
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26
See Erik M. Jensen, ‘‘Did the Sixteenth Amendment Ever
Matter? Does It Matter Today?’’ 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 799 (2014).
27
All the justices who wrote opinions in the great case of
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), accepted that
point, and other founding documents, including the Federalist
Papers, assumed that a real estate tax is direct. Several Hylton
justices in dicta suggested that the only direct taxes are capitations and taxes on real estate, an understanding that controlled
for almost a century and, in the minds of many, continues to
control today. In fact, beginning in 1798, Congress apportioned
several federal taxes on real property.
28
See supra note 4.
29
If states A and B have the same population but A has twice
as much wealth as B, the tax rates in A, the richer state, would
have to be lower than those applicable in state B. That would be
absurd, generally meaning that Congress is almost certainly not
going to enact a wealth tax today unless there is some way to
avoid this problem.
30
But see supra note 21.

of all kinds. One thing that means is that the
Supreme Court got it right in 1895 in concluding
that the 1894 income tax was invalid because it was
a direct tax that had not been apportioned.31 If
Natelson is correct on the income tax point, as I
think he is (but almost no one else does), the 16th
Amendment was necessary, as a matter of constitutional law, to have an unapportioned income tax.
(As would be true with a national wealth tax, an
apportioned income tax would be an absurdity.32)
Natelson also concludes that the penalty at issue
in NFIB was not a tax to begin with; it was what
Congress called it: a penalty. But if it was a tax, it
should have been characterized as a direct tax
subject to the apportionment rule. Because Congress didn’t apportion the penalty tax (doing so
would have defeated the purpose of the penalty),
the individual mandate ‘‘penalty’’ failed as a matter
of constitutional law.
C. The General Welfare
One question that has never resulted in an answer accepted by a consensus of commentators is
whether the general welfare clause of the Constitution — part of the taxing clause or, if you prefer, the
taxing and spending clause — provides independent authority for the enactment of, or restrictions
on, taxing legislation.33 Two recent articles focus on
general welfare as a possible limitation on, or
expansion of, the taxing power.
1. Jonathan S. Sidhu, ‘‘For the General Welfare:
Finding a Limit on the Taxing Power After NFIB v.
Sebelius,’’ 103 Cal. L. Rev. 103 (2015). Despite the
title, this interesting article is more about federalism
than the general welfare clause. I earlier said that I
was ignoring articles on federalism, with one exception. This is the exception.34
Sidhu argues that courts should treat congressional authority over the states in the same way for
purposes of both the taxing clause and the commerce clause, at least in general. (That proposition is
rebuttable, but, Sidhu argues, the presumption
should be that a divergence from commerce clause
principles is unlawful.) Congress should generally

31
See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)
(holding an unapportioned tax that reached income from real
estate unconstitutional), modified on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895)
(extending the Court’s principle to income from personal property and rejecting the entire 1894 tax). There were two sets of
opinions because the case was reargued.
32
Cf. supra note 29. To make the numbers come out right,
rates would have to be higher in a low-income state than in a
high-income state.
33
The taxing power is to be used ‘‘to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States.’’ U.S. Const. Art. I, section 8, cl. 1.
34
For another quasi-exception, see supra note 8.
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taxes. And some of its discussion raises the question
whether the meaning of direct taxes has continuing
relevance.26
1. John T. Plecnik, ‘‘The New Flat Tax: A Modest
Proposal for a Constitutionally Apportioned
Wealth Tax,’’ 41 Hastings L.Q. 483 (2014). Because
all or almost all the founders assumed that a tax on
real estate would be direct,27 the assumption has
generally been that a wealth tax would be a direct
tax that would have to be apportioned under the
direct tax clauses to be constitutional.28 And apportionment would generally defeat the purpose of a
wealth tax.29
Professor Plecnik nevertheless has made an
imaginative attempt to craft a wealth tax that could
be apportioned without absurd effects. He argues
for a wealth tax that would be imposed at a uniform
rate across the country, with the federal government
retaining each state’s share of the tax determined by
applying the apportionment rule. The excess for
any state would be refunded to the state through a
state-level pickup tax. The bottom line: Taking into
account the working of the ‘‘new flat tax’’ as a
whole, each state would bear only its apportioned
share of the national wealth tax. Constitutional
problem solved, although whether the proposal is
politically possible is another matter. I think not.30
2. Natelson, ‘‘What the Constitution Means by
‘Duties, Imposts, and Excises’ — and ‘Taxes’ (Direct or Otherwise),’’ 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 297
(2015). This second Natelson article is filled with
insights about the original understanding of those
various terms — meanings he ties to the Court’s
analysis in NFIB. Natelson concludes that the original understanding of direct taxes was much broader
in scope than today’s conventional wisdom would
suggest: that the term was understood to include
not only capitations and taxes on property but also
taxes on businesses and trades, and taxes on income

COMMENTARY / LAW REVIEW SUMMARIES 2015

35

article with a suspect point: that ‘‘no matter how
you parse it, a penalty on going without health
insurance is not a tax on income.’’ That may be true
enough (although not everyone would agree36), but
it’s not what the Court said in NFIB.37
D. Taxing Power Articles Not Focused on NFIB
The Constitution requires that ‘‘Duties, Imposts
and Excises [generally referred to as indirect taxes
in founding debates] . . . be uniform throughout the
United States,’’38 but direct taxes (other than taxes
on income, which are governed by the 16th Amendment) must be apportioned among the states on the
basis of population.39 Whether a tax goes into the
direct tax box or the indirect tax box is therefore
critically important.
Although Congress did apportion several real
estate taxes between 1798 and 1861, no tax has been
apportioned since then, and it’s almost inconceivable that Congress would attempt to apportion a tax
today. Classifying a proposed tax as direct, and not
exempted from apportionment by the 16th Amendment,40 would probably kill the legislation in Congress.
But that’s unlikely to be a problem, except perhaps with a proposed tax on wealth. That’s partly
because the early Supreme Court gave a cramped
interpretation of direct taxes, leaving the apportionment rule to apply to very little.41 Moreover, for
taxes that are unquestionably direct taxes — such as
taxes on property42 — the apportionment requirement makes those taxes generally unworkable.
1. Evgeny Magidenko, ‘‘Classifying Federal Taxes
for Constitutional Purposes,’’ 45 U. Balt. L. Rev. 57
(2015). This article is a useful catalog of the important judicial decisions over the years dealing with
what distinguishes direct taxes from indirect taxes.
And it’s an interesting attempt to categorize several
proposed taxes as either direct or indirect, and, if

36
The amount of the individual mandate penalty applicable
to a person who doesn’t acquire health insurance does depend
on the person’s income.
37
The Court concluded that the individual mandate penalty,
although a tax, wasn’t a direct tax. As a result, there was no
reason to consider whether the penalty was a tax on income.
The 16th Amendment matters only if the apportionment requirement would otherwise apply — that is, if the tax is a direct
tax that would otherwise have to be apportioned.
38
See supra note 3.
39
See supra notes 4-5.
40
See supra note 5.
41
See supra note 27 (discussing Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171).
42
The Supreme Court, in Farmers’ Loan & Trust, extended the
Hylton proposition that a tax on real property is direct to apply
to a tax on personal property as well (and to the income from
property of any kind). See supra note 31. Roberts seems to have
blessed that understanding in NFIB. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2598.

514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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be unable to ignore limits on the commerce power
by invoking the taxing clause, which is in effect
what happened, or what was deemed to have
happened, in NFIB.
Sidhu provides a three-part test to determine
whether taxes are inconsistent with the commerce
clause and should therefore be treated as unlawful.
The Sidhu approach requires looking at (1) whether
the purported tax in fact raises revenue (a traditional test in this area, but one for which the
Supreme Court has required only that minimal
revenue be raised); (2) whether the purported tax is
coercive (Roberts in NFIB had concluded that the
individual mandate penalty was really a tax because it gave Americans a choice — it was an
inducement rather than a punishment); and (3)
whether the subject matter of the purported tax
belongs to the states (hence the connection with
federalism). On that last point, the concern is that
Congress should not be able to usurp powers
reserved to the states under the Constitution by
invoking the taxing clause as justification for its
actions.
One example Sidhu provides in support of this
analytical framework is a purported tax on guns
carried near school zones — which would be a clear
attempt to use the taxing power to circumvent the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez.35
In Lopez, the Court invalidated the Gun Free School
Zones Act of 1990, which made carrying firearms in
‘‘school zones’’ (as defined in the act) a federal
offense, in that the act exceeded Congress’s powers
under the commerce clause. In Sidhu’s view, the
hypothetical tax should fail as well.
2. Mark Klock, ‘‘The Taxing Power of the Federal
Government and the General Welfare: What Are
the Limits in the Wake of NFIB v. Sebelius?’’ 76 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 325 (2015). Professor Klock not unreasonably argues that the taxing power and the
spending power must be read in tandem. In that
regard, ‘‘provid[ing] for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States’’ is certainly
broad in scope, and courts should give significant
deference to congressional enactments. But congressional power isn’t limitless. For example, Klock
posits, although spending on defense and, say, the
interstate highway system arguably benefit the general welfare, spending on benefits that accrue to
individual households might not, in some circumstances, be sufficiently tied to that general welfare.
This particular distinction might not be accepted
by courts, but Klock has to be right that the taxing
power is not limitless, that not every tax provides
for the general welfare. However, he concludes the

COMMENTARY / LAW REVIEW SUMMARIES 2015

E. Other Articles of Note
A couple of other articles on taxation and the
Constitution struck this reader’s fancy.
1. James R. Hines Jr. and Kyle D. Logue, ‘‘Delegating Tax,’’ 114 Mich. L. Rev. 235 (2015). This piece is
an extended argument in support of the proposition
that Congress should have the same power to
delegate its taxing power to administrative agencies
that it has in general to delegate rulemaking authority. Taxation is not sui generis. The assumption over
the years has been that Congress may not delegate
its taxing power, and it’s probably a good idea that
delegation, if it is to occur at all, should be an
unusual occurrence. But in special circumstances,
the argument of professors Hines and Logue could
add legitimacy to delegations that today’s conventional wisdom would characterize as invalid.
2. Adam Rosenzweig, ‘‘The Article III Fiscal
Power,’’ 29 Const. Comm. 127 (2014). The taxing
clause is part of Article I, right? Yes, but Professor
Rosenzweig argues that in some special circumstances, the Supreme Court can, under its Article III
powers, ‘‘impose taxes and borrow money, wholly
separate from the powers of Congress to do so
under Article I [that is, the taxing clause] or any

potential powers of the President to do so under
Article II.’’43 The special circumstances would arise
if Congress authorizes spending by statute, the
executive takes steps to execute the law, but Congress then withdraws the president’s power to do
so. If not spending the money would violate the
Constitution, the Court should have the power to
order the president to raise the funds and spend
them, or even to raise the funds itself through either
taxation or borrowing.
Whether any of this would actually happen is
another question, of course. But one of the merits of
his analysis, Rosenzweig argues, is that the president and Congress, knowing that this important
residual power lies in the Supreme Court, would be
less likely to take steps that would lead to stalemate
in the first place.
*****
The articles I reference are all worth a look. I’m
sure I missed other articles of merit on taxing power
issues, including some must-reads, and I probably
missed a few constitutional arguments hidden in
articles whose focus was not the taxing power.
Further, I admit that my views about constitutional
issues are idiosyncratic, so you might consider my
choices bizarre. I apologize to everyone whose
work ought to be noted here but isn’t. If it’s any
consolation, must-reads will, by definition, eventually be read. And I’m sure that Tax Notes would
welcome letters pointing out other meritorious
works (and trashing — politely, I hope — the list I
have compiled here).

43

29 Const. Comm. at 128.
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direct, whether the apportionment rule might not
apply because of the 16th Amendment.
The second Natelson article cited above, although presumably motivated by NFIB, has a discussion of the classification of governmental
charges that is relevant in many contexts other than
those similar to NFIB. As noted earlier, Natelson
concludes that the category of direct taxes includes
a lot more than most commentators have suggested
— and, for that matter, more than the Supreme
Court has hinted at over the years.
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